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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent/

CHARLES WEBB/

Case No. 880283

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Webb appeals from his conviction of aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony/ in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County/ State of Utah.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1.

Was the defendant denied the effective

assistance of counsel at trial due to a conflict of interest
affecting his trial counsel?
2.

Was there insufficient evidence to sustain a

conviction for aggravated robbery?
3.

Did the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's

improper remarks at trial amount to misconduct warranting a
new trial?
4.

Did the trial court err in failing to suppress
1

evidence seized during the arrest of the defendant?
5.

Were the increased penalty provisions of Utah

Code Ann. §76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988) improperly applied to the
defendant?
6.

Was the defendant prejudiced by an instruction

which was in part argumentative and an improper comment on the
evidence?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable constitututional provisions, statutes
and rules for a determination of this case are:
1.

Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution.

2.

Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution.

3.

Article I, §12, Utah Constitution.

4.

Article I, §14, Utah Constitution.

5.

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988).

6.

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1978).

7.

Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501 (Supp. 1988).

8.

Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 (Supp. 1988).

9.

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7.

which texts are set forth in the attached Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1978) and an enhancement of one to
five years for use of a firearm pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988) in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At about 3:30 p.m. on October 21, 1987, King's Custom
Jewelers in Trolley Square, Salt Lake City, Utah was robbed of
jewelry, diamonds and cash, valued at approximately $40,000
dollars (T. 83-84, 174). In the store at the time was the
owner, Karekine Karmelian and a Trolley Square security guard,
Stephen Church, who had entered the store while the robbery
was in progress (T. 82-83, 96, 101). Subsequently, both
witnesses identified co-defendant John Humphrey as the lone
robber (T. 85, 187-188) .
The robbery lasted only minutes (T. 103, 138).
During the robbery, Mr. Karmelian was busy removing cash and
jewelry from the safe and display cases (T. 114-15, 125-130).
At the robber's direction, Mr. Church was occupied with
handcuffing himself to Mr. Karmelian (T. 200-02, 204). There
was minimal conversation (T. 84-85, 90, 95, 102-103, 128-129).
The witnesses varied in their physical description of the
robber in regards to his height, weight and clothing (T.
132-33, 136-37, 211-12, 214).
The two witnesses also varied in their description of
the robber's weapon.

Mr. Karmelian described it as a big

shotgun with a rusty colored barrel (T. 84, 88); Mr. Church as
a twelve-gauge pump shotgun with a silver barrel (T. 188,
191).

Neither witness could identify Exhibit 1, the shotgun

subsequently seized from Mr. Webb's home, as the gun used in
the robbery (T. 155, 219). In fact, the shotgun seized from
Mr. Webb did not have a rusty or silver colored barrel
3

(T. 148, 192). Additionally, Exhibit l f s handle is uniquely
wrapped in black tape (T. 153); yet, neither witness noticed
nor reported anything unusual about the handle of the shotgun
used in the robbery (T. 153, 192).
On November 3, 1987, Britt Martindale gave a
statement to the police implicating Mr. Webb and Mr. Humphrey
in the robbery (T. 330). On November 4, 1987, Mr. Webb and
Mr. Humphrey were arrested at the home of Mr. Webb and his
girlfriend, Renae Gregersen (T. 300, 330).
Early in the morning of that day, police officers
knocked on the Webb-Gregersen's door.

As Ms. Gregersen

unlocked the door, the police pushed it in and knocked her
down (T. 687, 696). The officers had guns drawn, pointed at
everyone including Ms. Gregersen's young son (T. 665, 672,
696) .
While Ms. Gregersen was kneeling on the floor, crying
and very agitated (T. 659, 668, 688), she was arrested and
asked to sign a search consent form (T. 301-02).

Her only

concern at the time was for her young infant, who was on a
heart monitor since the infant's twin had died from Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome (T. 688, 696). The infant was crying
all during this time (T. 673), and Ms. Gregersen has no memory
of having signed any consent form (T. 697).
After a three-hour search of the house, the only
items recovered were the shotgun as previously described, a
ring and a watch (T. 318-19; Exhibits 1, 2 & 3 respectively,
R. 166). The ring was found inside a jewelry case in the
4

master bedroom (T. 304). The watch was found in Ms.
Gregersen's purse (T. 318). No evidence of the robbery was
found in a search of Mr. Webb's car (T. 342).
On the day of the robbery, October 21, Mr. Webb, who
had been traveling as part of his business, was in Ely, Nevada
(T. 505-06) .

He put a dated receipt in evidence from his stop

in Ely (T. 506). He purchased the ring and watch from Britt
Martindale on November 2, 1987, and gave the ring to Renae
T. 510) .

The shotgun he had bought and modified for Renae a

long time ago (T. 514).
Britt Martindale testified that on October 21, 1987,
Mr. Webb and Ms. Gregersen drove up to her house around four
o'clock p.m. (T. 255); Humphrey was hidden in the trunk of
their car (T. 227-28)*.

They brought in a canvas bag (T. 230)

and a shotgun (T. 231) and began sorting through jewelry taken
out of the bag (T. 232). Humphrey, who was living at the
Martindale home at the time, went into the bathroom and shaved
off his beard (T. 229) . The shotgun and bag were hidden in
the Martindale home for several hours (T. 239) .

According

to Britt, that night Webb, Humphrey and her husband, Russell
Martindale, left for Las Vegas (T. 241).
Ms. Martindale never gave any explanation why this
took place at her house.

She admitted that at the time of the

robbery she and her husband were estranged but had since
reconciled (T. 248) .

She knew that Russell had stolen the

vehicle used as the get-away car for the robbery (T. 252). At
trial, it was established that Russell Martindale had been

5

granted immunity for the theft of the vehicle (T. 249). No
search was ever made of the Martindale home (T. 340-41) .
Prior to trial, Mr. Webb filed a Motion to Suppress
the evidence seized from his home at the time of his arrest
(R. 65-66; argued T. 645-708).
(R. 68-69).

The motion was denied

He then filed a Supplemental Motion to Suppress

Evidence (R. 102; argued Supp. T. 7-38) which was denied
R. 119). The motion was raised and denied again at the start
of trial (T. 60-61).
Additionally, Mr. Webb moved to sever his trial from
Ms. Gregersen's and Mr. Humphrey's trial (R. 82). This was
granted as to Ms. Gregersen (R. 68-69).

In Mr. Webb's

post-trial Motion for a New Trial (R. 285-286) , he again
raised the severance issue as well as the conflict of interest
created by two public defenders serving as counsel for himself
and Humphrey at their joint trial (R. 287-288) .

The motions

were denied (T. 743).
At the end of the State's case, Mr. Webb moved for a
directed verdict of acquittal based on the insufficency of
the evidence (T. 425). This motion was renewed prior to jury
deliberation (T. 622) and in Mr. Webb's Motion for a New Trial
(T. 741-42; R. 285). All of the above motions were denied
(T. 425, 622, 742-43) .
Prior to trial, Mr. Webb moved in limine to exclude
all evidence of any claimed prior bad acts of his (R. 105-06;
Supp. T. 3-7) .

The motion was granted (Supp. T. 6-7) .

The

admonition against such evidence was restated at the start of
6

trial (T. 61-62).

Despite this, during the trial, the

prosecutor made or elicited references concerning a previous
police stop of Mr. Webb (T. 488-89, 523, 617; objections T.
488, 523, 746), evidence of other crimes (T. 304-05; objection
T. 305; argued T. 323-24), and Mr. Webb's alias (T. 327;
objection T. 327; argued T. 428-429) .

Other specific

instances of prosecutorial misconduct will be discussed infra
as appropriate to the argument.
Prior to the giving of instructions, Mr. Webb
objected to the language of Instruction No. 16 (T. 624-25,
misidentified there as No. 17) .
On June 22, 1988, after a jury trial, Mr. Webb and
co-defendant Humphrey were found guilty of aggravated robbery,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §77-6-302 (1978).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant Webb was denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel because his appointed counsel, the Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association, improperly represented both
Mr. Webb and his co-defendant Humphrey at their joint trial.
This conflict of interest warrants a reversal of Mr. Webb's
conviction.
The prosecutor continually and intentionally violated
a pre-trial order limiting inquiry into other alleged bad acts
of Mr. Webb and otherwise solicited improper remarks.

The

cumulative effect of the prosecutor's conduct created
prejudice to Mr. Webb justifying reversal in light of the
general insufficiency of the evidence against Mr. Webb.
7

Evidence seized during the arrest of the defendants
should have been suppressed since it was not seized pursuant
to a search warrant, nor incident to arrest nor pursuant to
any consent.

In light of the insufficiency of the evidence,

the improper introduction into evidence of the items so seized
prejudiced Mr. Webb and warrant a reversal of his conviction.
The imposition of an enhanced penalty based on the
use of a firearm was improper due to the structure of the
aggravated robbery statute.

Even if permissibly imposed, the

maximum enhanced penalty is limited to an additional five
years.

The case should be remanded for resentencing.
The language of Instruction No. 17 prejudiced

Mr. Webb by improperly presenting argument and comment on the
evidence.

In light of the insufficiency of the evidence,

Mr. Webb's conviction should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR. WEBB WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO A
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AFFECTING
HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY'S PERFORMANCE.
A.

Requirement of Separate State Analysis.

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution
provides, in pertinent part, that:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel . . . . In no
instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.

8

The state provision clearly differs in language from the Sixth
Amendment of the federal constitution which guarantees an
accused in a criminal prosecution the "assistance of counsel
for his defense."
The federal provision has been universally
interpreted as requiring the reasonably effective assistance
of counsel.

Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 25 L.Ed 2d 763 (1984).

Utah has adopted the same

standard in applying the federal provision.
758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988).

State v. Lovell

Under either federal or state

case law, a defendant who claims that his rights to the
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment were violated
must show that his trial counsel "rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner ... and that [his]
counsel's performance prejudiced" him.

State v. Julian, Case

No. 870351 (Utah S. Ct., March 28, 1989); State v. Speer, 750
P.2d 186 (Utah 1988) and State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019
(Utah 1987) .

A defendant is prejudiced when "a reasonable

probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the
result would have been different."

State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d

909, 913; Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 694.

Any

modification of the federal interpretation of the federal
constitutional standard has been expressly rejected by the Utah
Court.

State v. Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 41 n. 2 (1989).

However, despite repeated requests for separate analysis
of the state constitutional provision, State v. Lafferty, 749
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) and State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah

9

1987) , no Utah decision has ever considered the parameters of
the state guarantee.

This omission has created state case law

which simply "marchts] lock-step with interpretation given to
. . . the United States Constitution." State v. Bishopr 717
P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 1986) (J. Durham, concurring opinion).
But:
The legal revolution which has brought
federal law to the fore must not be allowed
to inhibit the independent protective force
of state law - for without itf the full
realization of our liberties cannot be
guaranteed.
Wm. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of
Individual Rights, 90 Harvard L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977).
Unfortunately, because the Utah courts until 1986
failed to even note the need for any separate analytic
comparisons of state and federal constitutional provisions,
earlier case law is of little value.

To compound the void of

precedent, there is virtually no legislative history
discussing the intent of the Utah founders in not adopting the
federal language.

Yet, the failure of prior Utah cases to

fully articulate the parameters of state constitutional
protection cannot excuse passivity now.

For even where the

state and federal prohibitions are textually identical, state
court decisions interpreting the state provision remain state
law despite subsequent federal doctrinal changes.

State v.

Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982); Carson, "Last
Things Last":

A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in

State Courts, 19 Willamette L. Rev. 641 (Fall, 1983).
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This Court is then faced with a "clean slate" in
analyzing Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution.

While the state may claim that this Court

should not generally construe the Utah constitutional
provision more narrowly, such an argument fails to recognize
that:
Because United States Supreme Court
decisions ... mark the minimum guarantees
of individual rights, state courts that
give truly independent force to their own
constitutions generally reach results more
protective of those rights than the Supreme
Court.
The New Federalism;

Toward a Principled Interpretation of the

State Constitution, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 297, at 297 (1977).

The

federal decisions may persuade, but they cannot compel, the
acceptance of the federal minimum guarantee as the statefs
maximum defense of individual rights.

State v. Jewett, 500

A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) .
The application of this analysis will be discussed
below.
B.

Requirements of a Conflict of Interest.

As discussed, before the alleged deficiencies of a
counsel's performance will be considered by an appellate
court, the defendant must establish that he "suffered unfair
prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiencies."

State v.

Lovell, 758 P.2d 909; State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1987).

Absent actual prejudice, a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel will not warrant reversal of a
conviction. Id.
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But, an entirely different approach is taken where
the claim of ineffectiveness is, as here, based on a conflict
of interest in the representation of the defendant.
tl]f a criminal defendant is represented at
trial by an attorney, either appointed or
retained, who labors under an actual, and
not merely a potential conflict of
interest, the defendant has been denied
effective assistance of counsel as a matter
of law; and, unless he has knowingly and
intelligently waived his sixth amendment
right to confict-free representation,
reversal is automatic. No prejudice need
be shown. (Citations omitted).
United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 1980)
relying on Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173,
55 L.Ed 2d 426 (1978) .
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the convictions when it
concluded that the trial court had improperly required a
public defender to jointly represent three defendants despite
timely objections that such representation created a conflict
of interest.

Where the potential of a conflict had been

raised at trial, the Court held that prejudice would be
presumed.

435 U.S. at 490.
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court

refined its standard.

In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,

100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed 2d 333 (1980), unlike Holloway, the
defendant first claimed that his lawyers represented
conflicting interests in a post-conviction habeas corpus
action.

Noting that under the facts, the defendant had not

established that an actual conflict of interest existed but
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merely had demonstrated the possibility of conflict/ the Court
held that reversal was not mandated.

466 U.S. at 350.

From thisf two rules evolve.

Where a potential

conflict is brought to the attention of the trial court prior
to or during trial and the trial court fails to actf the mere
fact of a potential or possible conflict will warrant reversal
without any further showing of prejudice.

Where/ however/ the

conflict is not brought to the attention of the trial court
but only raised on appeal/ the defendant "must demonstrate the
existence of an actual conflict of interest."

People v.

Jones/ 520 N.E.2d 325/ 328 (111. 1988); United States v.
Newman/ 733 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1984).
Stated another wayr it is now recognized:
. • . that prejudice would be irrelevant if
it could be shown that [the attorney's]
conflict of interest had any actual effect
whatever on his representation of [the
defendant].
Sanchez v. State/ 756 S.W.2d 452/ 454 (Ark. 1988).

It is only:

. . . necessary that a conflict of interest
must have actually existed or have been
inherent in the facts of the case from
which the possibility of prejudice flowed.
State v. Thompson/ 108 Ariz. 500/ 502 P.2d 1319/ 1323 (1972).
Turning to the facts at bar/ Mr. Webb was arrested on
November 4 f 1987 and a legal defender was appointed to
represent him (R. 9 ) . A preliminary hearing was held for
Defendants Webb and Humphrey on November 24 and 25; both were
represented by members of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders
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Association.

(R. 16-18).

On December 11, 1987, at the time

of the district court arraignment, the L.D.A. withdrew from
representing Mr. Webb and Mr. Webb privately retained Mr. Ray
Stoddard to represent him (R. 2 1 ) . Subsequently, Webb and
Humphrey's trial was severed from that of Mr. Webb's
girlfriend, Renee Gregerson (R. 68-69).

On March 10, 1988,

Mr. Stoddard filed a Motion to Sever Defendant Webb from
Humphrey but moved to withdraw as counsel at the same time
(R. 81-82).

On March 22, 1988, the Salt Lake Legal Defenders

Association was again appointed to represent Mr. Webb.
(R. 88). This appointed representation continued through
trial.

No ruling was ever made on the motion to sever Mr.

Webb from Co-defendant Humphrey.
withdrawal of the motion.

No minute entry shows the

Co-defendant Humphrey raised the

issue pro se (R. 98). Mr. Webb re-raised the severance issue
in his Motion for New Trial (R. 287-88).
Entwined with Mr. Webb's repeated requests for
severance from Humphrey, is his claim that there was both an
inherent and actual conflict of interest in the Salt Lake
Legal Defenders Association jointly representing himself and
Humphrey under the facts and circumstances of his case (R.
287-88) .
To be clear, it is not Defendant Webb's position that
the joint representation by associated attorneys is per
se prohibited.

Batchelor v. Smith, 555 P.2d 871 (Utah 1976).

Nor, is it his position

that he was entitled to severance as
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a matter of right.
1986) and cases

State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah

cited therein.

Rather, where the evidence was

strong against Co-defendant Humphrey as the actual robber and
only suspect or weak against Mr. Webb as an accomplice, the
joint representation by L.D.A. in a joint trial precluded Mr.
Webb's trial attorney from affirmatively arguing that Humphrey
was indeed guilty and that Mr. Webb was being drawn in through
mere association.

As stated in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.

at 490-491,
In a case of joint representation of
conflicting interest the evil . . . is in
what the advocate finds himself compelled
to refrain from doing, not only at trial
but also as to possible pretrial plea
negotiations and in the sentencing process.
It may be possible in some cases to
identify from the record the prejudice
resulting from an attorney's failure to
undertake certain sentencing trial tasks,
but even with a record of the sentencing
hearing available it would be difficult to
judge intelligently the impact of a
conflict on the attorney's representation
of a client. And to assess
the impact of a
conflict of interest in the attorney's
options, tactics and decisions in plea
negotiations would be virtually impossible.
Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless
error here would require, unlike most
cases, unguided speculation. (Emphasis
added.)
The issue is whether a potential conflict existed such that
trial counsel would have been affected in her representation
of Defendant Webb.
In determining whether a conflict existed, one first
must look to ethical considerations.
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The American Bar

Association Standards for Criminal Justice state:
Standard 4-3.5(b): Except for preliminary
matters such as initial hearings or
applications for bail, a lawyer or lawyers
who are associated in practice should not
undertake to defend more than one defendant
in the same criminal case if the duty to one
of the defendants may conflict with the duty
to another. The potential for conflict of
interest in representing multiple defendants
is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should
decline to act for more than one of several
co-defendants except in unusual situations
when, after careful investigation, it is
clear that:
(i)

no conflict is likely to develop;

(ii) the several defendants give an
informed consent to such multiple
representation; and
(iii) the consent of the defendants is
made a matter of judicial record. In
determining the presence of consent by the
defendants, the trial judge should make
appropriate inquiries respecting actual or
potential conflicts of interest of counsel
and whether the defendants fully comprehend
the difficulties that an attorney sometimes
encounters in defending multiple clients.
American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, 2d
Ed. Vol. I, Defense Function, §4-3.5 "Conflict of Interest."
Similarly, the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
Utah Supreme Court require, in pertinent part:
Rule 1.7(b) A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a
third person or by the lawyer's own
interest, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely
affected; and
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(2) Each client consents after
consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation to each client of the
implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved.
Both in the Comments to the Utah rule and the Commentary to
the A.B.A. standard, the writers recognized that the
"potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple
defendants in a criminal case is so grave" that normally joint
representation by the same lawyer or law firm should not
occur.

A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice, 2d Ed. Vol. I,

Defense Function, §4-3.5, Commentary at 4-41; Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule
1.7, Comments at 185 (Conflicts in Litigation).

Moreover, the

obligation of the attorney to explore and explain the
situation is particularly strong in criminal cases because a
criminal defendant is often either willing or coerced into
accepting any representation.

A.B.A. Standards, Id.

Utah law has even codified the minimum standards
governing appointed counsel, requiring among others the
"undivided loyalty" of appointed counsel in representing an
indigent defendant.

Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1(4) (Supp. 1988).

While Utah courts have never held that joint
representation by a legal defender organization of
co-defendants in a criminal trial is per se prohibited, this
Court has concluded that such representation is suspect and
should be examined.

State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (Utah 1980).

In Smith, one legal defender represented two defendants at the
17

preliminary hearing stage.

When one defendant subsequently

plead guilty, a different public defender represented the
remaining defendant at trial.
but only raised on appeal.

No objection was made at trial

The Utah Supreme Court determined

that a conflict did exist in the representation but found no
actual prejudice.

Despite this lack of prejudice, reversal

was warranted because:
...the assistance of counsel is among those
"constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error."
621 P.2d at 699, quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
23, 87 S. Ct. 824, 31 L.Ed 2d 483 (1967) . 1
Other courts have taken a similar approach to State
v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697.

In Commonwealth v. Westbrook, 400

A.2d 160 (Penn. 1979), the conviction was overturned where
separate public defenders represented two brothers with
adverse interests even though not co-defendants.

In State v*

Robinson, 662 P.2d 1341 (N. Mex. 1983) , the court concluded
factually that no actual conflict existed where a public
defender had briefly represented a potential co-defendant
turned witness because independent counsel had been appointed

x

Now Chief Justice Hall dissented in State v. Smith based on
the defendant's failure to object at trial and the facts of
the case, 621 P.2d at 700-701. Such a position is still
consistent with the rule stated on page 13 of this brief;
either an actual conflict must exist or the conflict must be
inherent from the facts such that a "possibility of prejudice
flows." Neither case requires proof of actual prejudice. See
also State v. Tippetts, 584 P.2d 892 (Utah 1978), where the
trial court did inquire about a potential conflict but the
defendant affirmatively waived any objection.
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to represent the the defendant.

Relying on State v. Smith/

supra, the New Mexico court cautioned public attorneys to
avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
Still others have demanded that any time that there
is multiple representation by public defenders or any law
association/ there must be an inquiry and appraisal made as to
any potential conflicts.
1982).

State v. Bell/ 447 A.2d 525 (N.J.

This inquiry has often been in a Rule 11 format/ i.e./

a narrative discussion with the defendant and counsel
concerning any potential conflicts and if appropriate a
knowing an voluntary waiver of those rights.
Petzr 764 F.2d 1390/ 1392 (11th Cir. 1985).

United States v.
These courts have

recognized that in the assignment of attorneys for
co-defendants assignment to outside independent counsel should
be the norm, and not the exception.
In the case at barf a potential conflict existed by
the mere fact of the legal defenders jointly representing
co-defendants - not a per se conflict/ but a potential.
inquiry was made.

No

The conflict was further brought to focus

when Mr. Webb sought severance from Humphrey in order to

Interestingly, even a decade agof seventy percent (70%) of
all public defender offices surveyed cautioned against
multiple representations and forty-nine percent (49%) refused
such representation. 447 A.2d at 530 n.8, citing Lowenthal/
Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal,
64 Va. L.Rev. 939/ 950 n.40 (1978).
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fully pursue his defense (R.81-82).
held.

Still no hearing was

Even when Mr. Webb expressly raised the conflict

issue (R.287-288), the trial court refused to adequately
address the issue (T. 743).
Clearly, the facts of the case raised actual conflict
questions.

In brief/ independent counsel would have bolstered

the identification of the eyewitnesses that Humphrey committed
the crime.

Independent counsel would have attacked the

credibility of Humphrey. Emphasis would have been placed on
the facts that at the time of the robbery Humphrey was living
with the Martindales, that Humphrey and Russ Martindale
traveled together the night of the robbery and that Humphrey
lived at the Martindales after the robbery.

Independent

counsel would have brought out that Britt Martindale needed a
"patsy" to protect her husband and used Webb because he knew
Humphrey.

Knowing that Webb would buy jewelry, Britt

Martindale sold Webb a few pieces from the robbery and then
immediately called the police knowing they would find Webb
with the evidence.

Independent counsel would have pointed out

that even if the jury believed that the gun found in Webb's
home was the gun used in the robbery that Humphrey had access
to the gun as it was merely left under the bed for Renee
Gregerson's protection.
Independent counsel would have actively sought a
severance from Humphrey and would have distanced Webb from
Humphrey in all aspects - as opposed to joint motions and
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joint voir dire (R.159-164).

Just how confusing this lumping

together can be became apparent when the trial judge insisted
that all defense witnesses were joint witnesses for purposes
of examination (T.360).

Independent counsel would have sought

a lesser included instruction on possession of stolen
property.

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983).
Instead, what was presented to the jury was a united

front where both defendants would succeed or fail together.
Unfortunately, such was not in the best interest of
Mr. Webb nor done with his agreement as evidenced by his
post-trial Motion for a New Trial (R.287-288).

What occurred

was a "diminution in [the] zeal of representation" of Mr.
Webb caused by the joint representation of co-defendants by
the same law association.

A.B.A. Standards for Criminal

Justice, 2d Ed. Vol. I, Defense Function §4-3.5, Commentary.
This lack of undivided loyalty, though not intentional on the
part of trial counsel, denied Mr. Webb the effective
assistance of counsel.
Therefore, this Court must decide if Utah's right to
counsel grants to an accused any rights beyond those minimally
guaranteed under federal law.

Specifically, if the Utah

constitutuion guarantees that no money or fees need be
advanced to secure the right of representations, it becomes
incumbent on this Court to require appointed counsel to act
without conflicts in the same manner as required of private
counsel.

If a single attorney or a private law firm could not

ethically or constitutionally represent both Mr. Webb and his
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Co-defendant Humphrey then no lesser standard can be imposed
where counsel is appointed. Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1(4) (Supp.
1988) .
Providing equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age-old
problem. . . . In this tradition, our own
constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection both call for
procedures in criminal trials which allow
no insidious discriminations between
persons and different groups of persons.
Both equal protection and due process
emphasize the central aim of our entire
judicial system - all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned,
"stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."
(Citations omitted).
Griffm v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, at 16-17, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100
L.Ed 2d 891 (1956).

While it is true that convenience and

economic considerations may encourage a "wink and nod" from
the trial courts in allowing legal defender associations to
routinely represent co-defendants, justice dictates a more
circumspect approach.
Inquiry at the trial level should be mandated in all
cases of multiple representations of co-defendants by the same
law association.

While heavy reliance should be placed on

counsel's evaluation of whether or not a conflict exists, the
trial court must also inquire of the defendant as to his
understanding of his right to conflict-free representation in
the context of the circumstances of the case.
If a potential conflict appears, remedial measures
should be required.

These could include severance,

appointment of independent counsel and/or an on-the-record
waiver of the conflict by defendant in a Rule 11 format.
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Most

importantly, attorneys must be encouraged to review their
representation for conflicts early on in the case.

Any doubts

must be resolved in favor of the defendant.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A
CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY.
The standard employed when reviewing the sufficiency
of evidence and reversing a jury verdict is well-established.
The appellate court must:
. . . review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only
when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted. (Citations omitted).
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

However,

. . . this Court still has the right to
review the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict. The fabric of
evidence against the defendant must cover
the gap between the presumption of
innocence and the proof of guilt . . .
[T]he reviewing court will stretch the
evidentary fabric as far as it will go.
But this does not mean that the court can
take a speculative leap across a remaining
gap in order to sustain a verdict.
Id. at 444-45.
Such impermissible speculative leaps have been
identified by this Court in a number of cases.

When

accomplice and witness testimony is insufficient in that it
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"castts] a mere suspicion on the defendant/1 a conviction
cannot be sustained on the mere possession of stolen property.
State v. Laris, 2 P.2d 243, 248-49 (Utah 1931).

If the

evidence tends to show a person other than the defendant stole
the property now in the possession of the defendant, the
evidence is insufficient.
P. 1023, 1029 (1911).

State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119

Mere possession of a gun used in a

burglary without more is insufficient.

State v. Nichols, 145

P.2d 802, 806 (Utah 1944) .
The evidence adduced at Mr. Webb's trial is
insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery,
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1978).

Neither the store owner nor

the security guard identified Mr. Webb as the armed robber
(T. 85, 187-188).

None of Mr. Webb's fingerprints were found

in the alleged get-away vehicle found near Trolley Square
(T. 368-69, 379), a vehicle which Russell Martindale stole
(T. 262, 344, 394). The only evidence against Mr. Webb
consisted of the testimony of Britt Martindale and the gun,
ring and watch seized from Mr. Webb's apartment some two weeks
after the robbery.

Without Britt Martindale's testimony,

there was no evidence to support a robbery conviction against
Mr. Webb, at best, it could be argued that he had possession
of stolen property.

State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987).

What the evidence did establish is that Mr. Humphrey
robbed the jewelry store (T. 85, 187-188).

Further, the

evidence established that the person who stole the get-away
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vehicle was Russell Martindale (T. 262, 344f 394), that
Humphrey was living at the Martindales at the time of the
robbery (T. 277, 343), that immediately after the robbery,
Humphrey shaved off his beard at the Martindale's home (T.229)
and that same night left for Las Vegas, Nevada with Russell
Martindale (T. 241). Subsequently, Humphrey returned to stay
at the Martindalefs (T. 293-294, 434).
In this context comes Britt Martindale, wife of
Russell Martindale (T. 222). The Martindales had been
separatee1 prior to the robbery, (T. 248) despite this, Russell
Martindale as well as Humphrey were at the Martindale home the
night of the robbery (T. 241). By her own admission, the
jewelry stolen as well as the shotgun used were left at her
house immediately after the robbery (T. 239). She did not deny
that she knew the items were from a robbery.

She also knew

her husband had stolen a car (T. 252). Wanting to help her
husband, she testified that she called the police about two
weeks after the robbery (T. 330). As a result, her husband was
not charged with any crimes in Ctah (T. 572) and the
Martindales reconciled (T. 248). However, at the time of her
testimony at Mr. Webb's preliminary hearing, Russell
Martindale had been given no immunity (R. 18; T. 288-289, 383).
In fact, only one week before Mr. Webb's trial, and only
because the defense had subpoenaed him to testify, was Russell
Martindale granted immunity (T. 249, 384, 573). The immunity
was not in regard to the robbery charges but only for stealing
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the vehicle in question (T. 572-573).

Thus, Britt

Martindalefs testimony that it was Mr. Webb and not her
husband who aided and abetted Defendant Humphrey must be
viewed as suspect and not compelling.
The evidence must be viewed with the defense evidence
that Mr. Webb was out of state on the day of the robbery
T. 508) , had purchased the jewelry items from Britt (T. 510) ,
and merely owned a gun somewhat similar but significantly
dissimilar to the one described by the eyewitnesses (T. 155,
219).

The evidence as a whole suggests that it was the

Martindales who were accomplices to the robbery, and not Mr.
Webb.

Given the suspect accomplice and witness testimcny, the

reasonable hypothesis that others committed the crime and the
lack of direct evidence of Mr. Webb's participation or
encouragement of the crime, Mr. Webb's conviction should be
reversed.
POINT III
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE
PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS AT TRIAL
AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT WARRANTING
A MISTRIAL.
This Court has consistently stated that in reviewing
improper statements of counsel:
. . . the test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict,
and were they, under the circumstances of
the particular case, probably influenced by
those remarks.
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State v, Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), quoting State v.
Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973).

In accord,

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) and State v.
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988).

Step one is generally

satisfied when the reirarks call "the jury!s attention to
matters suggesting that something other than the question of
the defendant's guilt or innocence is before the jurors."
State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986).
Step two is more difficult and involves a
consideration of the circumstances of the
case as a whole. In making such a
consideration, it is appropriate to look
at the evidence of defendant's guilt . . .
[Iln a case with less compelling proof,
this Court will more closely scrutinize
the conduct.
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486.
Such remarks, even though harmless when taken
separately, may necessitate a new trial based on their
cumulative effect.
Crim. App. 1982) .

Owens v. State, 654 P.2d 657, 659 (Okla.
Even one remark in violation of a court

order limiting a certain line of inquiry can be grounds for
reversal, if not "cut short . . . before any prejudice
occur[s]."

State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 525 (Utah 1983).

More so, deliberate and repeated violations of court orders
and instructions to the prosecution "may [more strongly]
constitute misconduct requiring a new trial."

State v.

Musgrave, 102 N.M. 148, 692 P.2d 534, 536 (N.M. App. 1984).
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In the case at bar, the prosecutor repeatedly and
flagrantly disregarded the trial courts pretrial order
prohibiting any references to other bad acts of Defendant Webb
(R. 105-06, T. 61-62) in the following areas:
1.

OREGON POLICE STOP

On October 29, 1987, a second-hand store called "Mike
The Traders" in Portland, Oregon was under surveillance by a
police stake-out.

Messrs. Webb and Humphrey were observed

talking to Mike Vaden the owner of the store.

Messrs. Webb

and Humphrey left but were stopped a short distance away for a
minor traffic violation.

The stake-out and stop were in no

way connected to the investigation of the Salt Lake City
robbery.
In this context, the prosecutor extensively crossexamined Mr. Humphrey about the stop over objection by Mr.
Webbfs trial counsel (T. 488-490; objection T. 488-489).
He continued the same tactic in cross-examining Mr. Webb
to the point of even directly asking:
PROSECUTOR COPE:

THOSE THINGS THAT YOU

SOLD WERE STOLEN, WERENfT THEY?
DEFENDANT WEBB:

NOT THAT I KNOW OF, SIR,

AND ANYTHING THAT WAS SOLD UP THERE WAS NOT
OUT OF A ROBBERY HERE EITHER, SIR.

These facts are uncontested and are derived from the
investigative reports of the Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office supplied to trial counsel through discovery, including
statements given the police by Russell Martindale on November
11 and 13, 1987. They were some of the facts specifically
referred in Defendant's Motion in Limine (T. 4-7).
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Q.

DO YOU REMEMBER WHO YOU SOLD IT TO?

A.

YES, I DO.

Q.

ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH WHAT THAT PERSON

TOLD THE POLICE REGARDING THE CONVERSATION
HE HAD WITH YOU WHEN YOU SOLD THE THINGS?
MS. WELLS:

OBJECTION.

(T. 523). The prosecutor reemphasized these improper facts
during his closing (T. 617). None of this information was
permissible.

Both defendants had admitted to being in

Portland together on the date in question (T. 48, 522-523).
Indeed from the night of the robbery, October 21st, to the
date of their arrest, November 4th, there was no dispute
nor particular relevance —
Co-defendant Humphrey.
the testimony.

—

to the whereabouts of Mr. Webb or

Neither defendant "opened the door" to

State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988).

Neither defendant had put his character into dispute, Utah
Rules of Evidence Rule 404(a), State v. Tarafa 720 P.2d 1368
(Utah 1986); nor, was the evidence relevant to prove motive or
intent, Rule 404(b), State v. Speer, supra.

It was solely

elicited for the improper purpose of persuading the jury that
Mr. Webb had been involved in other bad acts.

As such, it

should have been specifically excluded.
2.

OTHER CRIMES

Similiarily, the prosecutor continually attempted to
paint Mr. Webb as generally a criminal.

The prosecutor

elicited from Detective Lomax that rings found in Mr. Webb's
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home could be connected to uncharged crimes (T. 304-305;
objection T. 305). Just prior to Detective Lomax!s testimony,
the prosecutor elicited from Britt Martindale that other
robberies were contemplated by the defendants at other
locations (T. 291; objection T. 291-292) and that she did not
believe that Mr. Webb was a legitimate jewelry trader because
he sold expensive pieces cheaply (T. 292; hearing on objection
T. 323). A motion for mistrial based on the cumulative
prejudical effect of the above witnesses1 comments was made
but denied (T. 323-324) .
Additionally, the prosecutor elicited testimony that
Mr. Webb used an alias (T. 327; objection T. 327; argued
T. 428-29).

During his cross-examination of Mr. Humphrey, the

prosecutor intentionally elicited an answer which he knew
would be that both defendants were in jail (T. 491; objection
T. 540) .
In two outrageous instances, the prosecutor's
determination to portray Mr. Webb as a bad person and a
criminal become clear.

Ronda Blanchard, a defense witness

called to testify as to Britt Martindale1s reputation for
vericity, was asked on cross-examination:
PROSECUTOR COPE:

ISN'T IT TRUE THAT SHE

[BRITT MARTINDALE] TOLD YOU THAT MR.
HUMPHREY AND MR. WEBB WERE BAD PEOPLE AND
THAT THEY WERE STEALING THINGS?
(T. 502; objection sustained T. 502, see also T. 500-501).
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Similiarily, the prosecutor recalled Detective Ray Dallmg on
rebuttal (T. 547) to ask if the detective had questioned
Mr. Webb and if the detective had attempted to verify that
information (T. 552; objection T. 552-552) •

The prosecutor

stated, in front of the jury, in opposing the objection,
PROSECUTOR COPE:

YOUR HONOR, THE

DEFENDANTS TOOK THE STAND AND BECAME
WITNESSES BY SO DOING, I BELIEVE WE ARE
ALLOWED, AT THIS POINT, TO INDICATE, BY
OPINION OR REPUTATION, THAT THE
TRUTHFULNESS AND VERACITY IS POOR OR BAD.
THAT'S ALL I AM TRYING TO DO.
Again, none of these references were admissible under
the Utah Rules of Evidence Rules 404, 405 and 608, State v.
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, nor by the pretrial court order
(R. 105-106, T. 61-62).

The effect, in light of the totality

the evidence, cannot be considered harmless where the evidence
against Mr. Webb was not compelling but suspect.
Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984) .

State v.

Less flagrant and less

emulative prosecutorial misconduct has required reversal.
Where the prosecutor elicited comments that the defendant had
an alias, had been a protected federal witness and involved in
"other criminal matters" the effect was prejudicial, State v.
Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486.

Where the prosecutor in closing argu

that the pervasiveness of the crime required conviction to
send a message to others, reversal was warranted, State v.
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Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402.

Where the jury observed the

defendant in handcuffs and the prosecutor commented in closing
on a prior unrelated arrest, prejudice was found.

Owens v.

State, 654 P.2d 657, 659.
3.

OTHER PROSECUTORAL MISCONDUCT

In addition to the above, the prosecutor referred to
the fact that the defendants had not volunteered hair samples
for analysis (T. 373; objection T. 426); and, to
Mr. Humphrey's refusal to take part in a line-up (T. 615;
objection T. 623; and R. 289-90, T. 748). Such comments
either directly or inferentially on a defendant's failure to
give evidence are prohibited.

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,

554; State v. DeAlo 748 P.2d 195, 198-99 (Utah App. 1987).
In his closing, the prosecutor mischaracterized the
facts and the law by referring to Russell Martindale as
"always being a defense witness" (T. 572,) and that Martindale
had only been given immunity because "he was subpoenaed by the
defense and there's no point in having him take the stand and
claim his fifth amendment privileges" (T. 573). The
prosecutor referred to other crimes in other jurisdictions as
being the reason Martindale was "circumspect" in his testimony
(T. 572).

In actuality, no charges had ever been brought

against Mr. Martindale.

While there is wide latitude in a

closing argument, these deliberate comments and misstatements
merely add to the cumulative prejudice created by the
prosecutor.

State v. Valdez 513 P.2d 422, 426.
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This is not a case where the factual events
surrounding the crime are uncontested.
P.2d 186.

State v. Speer, 750

Rather, the facts are very much in dispute.

In

this context/ the repeated and flagrent misconduct of the
prosecutor prejudiced Mr. Webb's right to a fair trial and
warrant the reversal of his conviction.

State v. Troy, 688

P.2d 483.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING
THE ARREST OF MR. WEBB.
A.

The Shotgun, Watch and Ring Were
Seized Pursuant to an Unlawful Arrest
and Should Have Been Excluded at
Trial.

Utah law requires that when a peace officer makes an
arrest that he:
inform the person being arrested of his
intention, cause and authority to arrest
him.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-6 (1982).

But, no notice is required if:

there is reason to believe the notice will
endanger the life or safety of the officer
or another person or will likely enable the
party arrested to escape.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-6(1).

Similiarily, a peace officer in

effecting an arrest may "break the door or window of the
building in which the person to be arrested is," Utah Code
Ann. §77-7-8 (1982), but only if he has complied with the
notice provisions of §77-7-6 or falls within the exceptions
of §77-7-6(1).
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The purpose behind knock-and-wait statutes
is to effect a peaceful arrest, for:
When an officer bursts in with gun drawn
immediately after knocking, but without
waiting for a reply, and without announcing
his purpose.. . there [is] a potential for
violence to both occupants and police
arising from the manner of entry.
State v. Chichester, 48 Wash. App. 257, 738 P.2d 329, 332
(1987).

Equally, of concern, is the protection of the right

to privacy of the occupants.
(Alaska App. 1986).

State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 1006

Thus, where a defendant makes a prima

facie case of the police failing to comply with the notice
provisions, the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that
compliance did in fact occur or that extingent circumstances
existed at the time of the arrest.

United States v. Murrie,

534 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1976); State v. Johnson, supra; State
v. Chichester, supra; People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484 P.2d
1238 (1971) .

Proof of extingent circumstances must be made by

"pointing to specific, articulable facts and the reasonable
inferences therefrom which justify the intrusion", State v*
Chichester, 738 P.2d at 332.

Thus, where the police had

received a specific prior warning from the suspect's wife that
the suspect would fight if arrested and, upon knocking, the
officer heard suspicious noises inside indicating that the
suspect was searching for a weapon, extingent action ws
warranted.

^Id.

Failure to comply with a knock-and-announce

statute creates an illegal entry and any evidence derived from
the illegality should be suppressed.
1006.
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State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d

Similarily, this Court has held that §77-7-6 notice
requirements are not merely directive, but mandatory.

"To be

lawful, an arrest must be effected in accordance with
statutory dictates,"

McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678

P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1984) .
In the present case, the police knocked on the Webb's
door and without further warning or announcement pushed the
unlocked door open (T. 687, 696).

"Opening a closed but

unlocked door constitutes a 'breaking1 for the purposes of
knock and announce requirements," State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d
at 1008, citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585,
588-90, n.5, 88 S. Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed 2d 828, (1968).
No specific facts creating an exception to the
statutory requirement for prior warning were alleged.
Detective Jackson did testify that the arresting officers
assumed that the defendant was armed since a weapon was used
in the robbery (T. 651). However, such an assumption is
generally true of most felony arrests*

Danger can be created,

under such circumstances, by entering without warning as well
as by giving warning.

No extingent circumstances existed

justifying the police's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann.
§77-7-6 and § 77-7-8.
Because the statutes were not complied with, Mr. Webb's
arrest was unlawful and in violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of
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the Utah Constitution.

State v. Chichester, 738 P.2d at 332

Any evidence seized pursuant to the arrest and illegal entry
should be excluded.

The shotgun, ring and watch (Exhibits 1,

2 and 3, respectively, R. 166) should not have been admitted
at trial.

Without this evidence, there would have been no

physical evidence to tie Mr. Webb to the crime.
re. insufficiency of the evidence.)

(See Point I

Therefore, admission

of the illegally seized evidence was prejudical and Mr. Webb1
conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
B.

Even if the Arrest Is Found to Be
Lawful, the Subsequent Search of the
Premises Was Not Incident to the
Arrest nor Was There Valid Consent.

An appellate court will generally not disturb a
lower court's factual evaluation underlying its decision to
deny a motion to suppress unless the trial court's findings
are clearly erroneous, State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183
(Utah 1987); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).
However, to properly assess the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings, the appellate
court can afford no such deference but must apply a

For purposes of a defendant's right to be lawfully
arrested, both the federal and state constitutional provision
are uniform. This right is so universally recognized that no
separate constitutional analysis is required. The issue here
is whether there was compliance with a state statute defining
the procedure for a lawful arrest.
Mr. Webb was arrested in his home which he shared with
Ms. Renae Gregersen, originally a co-defendant in this case.
Also, arrested at the location, was the third co-defendant,
Mr. Humphrey. The evidence seized was found in a search of
the premises. The police had arrest warrants but no search
warrants (T. 300-02) .
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"correction of error" standard.

Qates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d

658, 659 (Utah 1988) .
As discussed in Point 1(A) of this brief, United
States Supreme Court decisions interpreting constitutional
rights merely mark the minimum guaranties of those individuals
rights.

State appellate courts must independently construe

the full extent of their state constitutional protections.
Any analysis of the legality of a search and seizure
must start with the assumption that any search conducted
"outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a
judge or magistrate, [is] per se unreasonable" under either
the state or federal constitution.

State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d

478, 482 (Utah 1981) (J. Wilkms concurring opinion), quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed 2d
576 (1967) .

This prohibition is subject to only a few

specifically defined exceptions; two of which are a limited
search incident to arrest and a valid consent search.

State

v. Griffin, 626 P.2d at 482 n.2. But it is the state's burden
to justify a warrantless search by establishing an exception
to the warrant requirement from the totality of the
circumstances.

State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986);

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 92 S. Ct. 204, 36 L.Ed
2d 854 (1973) .
An arrested suspect may consent to a warrantless
search of his property or premises, State v. Griffin, 629 P.2d
478, but to be valid such a consent must be "properly obtained
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and freely given."

State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375.

The

consent may not be merely a "peaceful submission by the
arrested suspect to the authority of a law enforcement
officer", but must be "an intelligent and intentional waiver
of a constitutional right."

Thurlow v. State, 81 Nev. 510, 406

P.2d 918, 921 (1965) .
The test of the voluntariness of the waiver is
threefold.

First, there must be clear and positive evidence

that the consent was specific and unequiviocal; second, the
consent must be given without duress or coercion; and, third,
the factual evidence surrounding the consent must be viewed
with a presumption disfavoring a waiver by the individual of
his constitutional rights.
544 (N. Mex. App. 1988).

State v. Anderson, 754 P.2d 542,
The presumption against a waiver

of constitutional rights is particularly strong where the
alleged consenting person is in custody at the time of
questioned consent.

Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th

Cir. 1965) .
Courts have universally held that there can be no
free and intelligent waiver where the consent was obtained
through intimidation or duress.

State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d

1375; Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827; State v. Kananen,
97 Ariz. 233, 399 P.2d 426 (En banc 1965).

Such coercion is

necessarily implicit where there are drawn guns, Weed, or
officers demanding entry upon the mere authority of their
badges, Kananen.
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In Mr. Webb's case, some ten arresting officers in
the early morning hours broke into the home with guns drawn,
knocking down Ms. Gregersen, who was dressed only in her
nightgown and robe.

(T. 696, 650, 652). Throughout the

arrest, Ms. Gregersen was distraught over her crying infant
who was on a heart monitor (T. 659, 668, 688, 696).

She was

worried about her older son, who the officers also had at
gunpoint (T. 687, 672, 696). Ms. Gregersen was crying and
upset when approached to give her consent (T. 668) .

She

could not remember signing any form (T. 696-697) .
The totality of the circumstances establish that
Ms. Gregersen had been threatened at gunpoint and was being
held in custody.

She believed her children were in danger.

In the midst of the drama of her arrest, she did not freely
consent but acquiesced out of fear and confusion.

Under these

circumstances, there is no way to tell what the scope of any
alleged consent would have been absent the intimidation and
duress.

Acting without a search warrant, the police failed to

obtain valid consent.
Despite the lack of a warrant or consent, Utah law
allows a limited search pursuant to a lawful arrest.

State v.

Griffin, 626 P.2d at 482, n. 2.
The underlying justifications for a warrantless
search of an arrestee's person and the area
within his immediate control are twofold: (1) to
remove weapons the arrestee may use to resist an arr
effect an escape, (2) to prevent concealment or
destruction of evidence linking the arrestee with
the crime.
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983).
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But, the area

of search must be limited to that "within the immediate
control" of the arrestee, for:
There is no comparable justification,
however, for routinely searching any room
other than that in which an arrest occurs
or, for that matter, for searching through
all the desk drawers or other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23
L.Ed 2d 685 (1969).

Thus, once an arrestee is handcuffed and

removed from a room, a search of that room cannot be justified
as incident to arrest since the room is no longer under the
arrestee's immediate control.

State v. Minear, 47 Ore. App.

995, 615 P.2d 416 (1980) .
Under this doctrine, if the arrest of the Mr. Webb is
found to be lawful, areas within his immediate control - but
only such areas - could be validly searched for weapons.
Here, Mr. Webb was lying on a bed in a bedroom at the time of
his arrest (T. 328, 665).

Simultaneously, Mr. Humphrey and

Ms. Gregersen were arrested (T. 665). All were handcuffed
T. 666). Ms. Gregersen was at the kitchen table; Messrs. Webb
and Humphrey were handcuffed and forced to lie on the kitchen
floor (T. 667-669).

Only after Mr. Webb was removed from the

bedroom and handcuffed was the bedroom searched and Exhibit 1,
the shotgun, located under the bed (T. 660, 674-675).

The

shotgun was then placed on the kitchen table, in the very room
where the handcuffed defendants were being held, and left
there while a further search of the home was made.
667-669) .

(T. 662,

It becomes far-fetched for the State to argue that

the gun was seized incident to arrest when it was the police
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who seized the gun in an unoccupied room and thereafter left
it in an area within the control of the defendant.

Nor,

factually, can the seizure of the shotgun be justified as
consentual where the police admit that the gun was seized
prior to any consent being given (T. 674-675) .
Even more tenuous is any claim that the ring taken
from a jewelry case in the bedroom (Exhibit 2; T. 304) or the
watch taken from Ms. Gregersen's purse (Exhibit 3; T. 318)
fall with a valid search incident to arrest.

After securing

all the defendants (T. 660, 667-669), a three-hour search of
the apartment occurred (T. 318-319) .

While a walk-through

search of a house looking for weapons may validly yield
evidence of criminal activity in plain sight, State v. Rocha,
600 P.2d 543, 545-46 (Utah 1979), it cannot be used to justify
the seizure of items not in plain view.

Additionally, once

the suspects are arrested, the police should look to other
alternatives to a warrantless arrest, such as securing the
premises and obtaining a search warrant.
P.2d at 180.

State v. Harris, 671

No extingent circumstances can exist where

"there is no likelihood that evidence still in the room would
be apt to disappear once the occupants of the [apartment] had
been removed," State v. Minear, 615 P.2d 416, 417.

Here, the

three adults were taken to jail and an aunt was called to
remove the children (T. 667). There was no danger of evidence
being hid or destroyed at the time of the arrest (T. 318);
and, there was opportunity to secure the premises
subsequently.

A warrant could have been obtained but was not.
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Since the consent was invalid and no other
justification for the warrantless search exists, Mr. Webbfs
rights under the Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution were violated.
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, having been illegally seized, should have
been suppressed at trial.

Where a reasonable possibility that

erroneously admitted evidence contributed to defendant's
conviction, the conviction should be reversed.

Thurlow v.

State, 406 P.2d 918, 922 (See Point II re. insufficiency of
the evidence.)
POINT V
THE INCREASED PENALTY PROVISIONS
OF UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-203(1)
(SUPP. 1988) WERE IMPROPERLY
APPLIED TO MR. WEBB'S CONVIC1ION
FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
A.

Principles of Statutory Construction
Require the Application of a Specific
Statute over a General Provision.

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988), otherwise known
as the enhancement statute, provides that a person convicted
of a first degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment:
In the case of a felony of the first
degree, for a term at not less than five
years and which may be for life but if the
trier of fact finds a firearm or a
facsimile or the representation of a
firearm was used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted
for a term of one year to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted
for an indeterminate term not to exceed
five years to run consecutJvely and not
concurrently.
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Consistently, the enhancement provision has been
interpreted as not charging a separate and distinct offense
from the crime charged but as more accurately describing how
specifically the felony was committed.
P.2d 992 (Utah 1978).

State v. Angus, 581

Thus, where a statute generally

prohibits a crime from being committed with a deadly weapon,
the defendant's penalty may be increased when that weapon is a
firearm.

State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988).

The

enhancement is merely part of the penalty based on the
specific type of weapon used.

Id.

This approach makes sense where the substantive
statute only prohibits the use of force in generic terms.
Examples are aggravated burglary, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203
(Supp. 1988), punishing burglary committed with the use of "a
dangerous or deadly weapon," State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186;
aggravated assault, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1978) ,
prohibiting assault by use of a "deadly weapon," State v.
Angus, 581 P.2d 992; or the homicide statute-, Uwan v-oae Ann.
§76-5-201 et seq., (Supp. 1988) which do not characterize the
offense by weapon use, State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah
1985) .

In each of these cases, this Court recognized the

legislative prerogative to distinguish between degrees of
dangerous weapons.

No clearer example is found than in the

statutory definitions of "dangerous weapon" being:
. . . any item that in the manner of its
use or intended use is capable of causing
death or serious bodily injury...;
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501 (2) (a) (Supp. 1988), and, the
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definition of "firearms" as,
. . . pistols, revolvers, sawed-off
shotguns or sawed-off rifles, or any device
that could be used as a weapon from which
is expelled a projectile by any force.
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501(2)(b) (Supp. 1988).

All firearms

are dangerous weapons but not all dangerous weapons are
firearms.
But a very different statutory scheme exists under
the aggravated robbery statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302
(1978) by which Defendant Webb was convicted.

Prior to 1975,

aggravated robbery was defined as robbery committed by use of
a deadly weapon.

(See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953)).

The

pre-1975 statute was consistent with the generic language of
the current aggravated burglary and aggravated assault
statutes.

However, a 1975 amendment to the aggravated robbery

statute changed this language to its present specific form,
that is:
A person commits aggravated robbery if in
the course of committing robbery, he . . .
uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm,
knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly
weapon . . . .
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1) (a).
critical.

The change in the language is

Under the burglary or assault statutes, a defendant

has one punishment if no weapon is used, an increased
punishment if a deadly weapon is used and the possibility of
enhancement if that deadly weapon is a firearm.

Three stages

of distinct dangerousness; three levels of punishment.
However, under the robbery statutes, a defendant has one
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punishment if no weapon is used, an increased punishment if a
firearm is used and still, according to the lower court, a
mandatory enhancement for the use of the same weapon, a
firearm.

Two stages of dangerous; yet, three levels of

punishment.
Such a statutory structure was rejected under nearly
identical facts in Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 55
L.Ed.2d 70, 98 S. Ct. 909 (1978).

Under the federal statutory

scheme, bank robbery had one punishment while aggravated bank
robbery, defined as robbery with a firearm, had an increased
penalty.

The issue was whether the federal enhancement

provision could also be imposed based on the use of the same
specified weapon, the firearm.

In remanding for

re-sentencing, the United States Supreme Court held that the
pyramiding of a sentence already increased by the use of a
firearm under the substantive offense:
would violate the
construction that
ambit of criminal
resolved in favor
omitted.)

established rule of
'ambiguity concerning the
statutes should be
of lenity.1 (Citations

435 U.S. at 14.
... "This policy of lenity means that a
Court will not interpret a federal criminal
statute so as to increase the penalty that
it places on an individual when such an
interpretation can be based on no more than
a guess as to what Congress intended1.
(Citations omitted.)
435 U.S. at 15.

Additionally, the Court held that as a

corollary to the rule of lenity, precedence must be given to
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the more specific statute (robbery by use of a firearm) over
the more general enhancement provision where both were focused
on the same concern.

435 U.S. at 15.

These same principles of statutory construction have been
recognized and adopted by the Utah courts.
It is well-established that ambiguities
in criminal statutes must be resolved
in favor of lenity, . . .
State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, at 562, n. 3 (Utah 1987),
citing Simpson v. United States in regards minimum mandatory
sentencing schemes.
Turning to the Utah statutes, it is not sufficient to
merely dismiss that fact that in 1975, after the Utah
enhancement statute was enacted, the Utah legislature amended
the general language in the aggravated robbery statute to
include specific reference to the use of a firearm.

It must

be assumed that the legislature had a specific purpose to its
actions, especially where it declined to amend other
"aggravated" statutes.

While it is true that the result is

replent with ambiguities, such a situation has been recognized
in other interpretations of the enhancement statute.

See for

example, State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984).
The language of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1) (a) is
clear.

Where a person commits a robbery with a firearm his

The Simpson Court also based its decision on double
jeopardy grounds finding that the substantive statute and the
enhancement statue were separate offenses. 435 U.S. at 10.
Such an approach was specifically rejected by this
Court in State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978) decided
subsequent to Simpson but without reference to it.
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punishment will be increased to a first degree felony, five to
life.

No principle of statutory construction allows for the

further pyramiding of punishment by imposition of the enhanced
penalty under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(1).

Mr. Webb's case

should be remanded to the lower court for resentencing.
B.

Even if the Enhancement Provisions
Are Found Applicable, the Total
Increase Allowable Is Limited to Five
Years.

Even if the enhancement provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988) are found to be applicable to Mr.
Webb's aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court erred in
imposing a six year term of enhancement.
The Judgment and Commitment Order (R. 280) reads:
Pursuant to UCA 76-3-203(1), the Court
further sentences defendant Charles William
Webb to serve a mandatory one year for use
of a firearm and discretionary five years
for use of a firearm, each to run
consecutively to the sentence of five years
to life.
However, the lower court's only authority was to impose a
total enhancement of five years.
601, 603 (Utah 1984).

State v. Willett, 694 P.2d

This case should be remanded for

correction of the sentence.
POINT VI
MR. WEBB WAS PREJUDICED BY AN
INSTRUCTION WHICH WAS IN PART
ARGUMENTATIVE AND AN IMPROPER
COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE.
Language in an instruction which is more properly
part of counsel's argument is inappropriate. It is a misplaced
comment on the evidence of the case and not a clear statement
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of the law for the jury's benefit.
173, 175 (Mont. 1980).

State v. Pecora, 619 P.2d

Instruction No. 16 (R. 245), which was

objected to in a timely fashion (T. 624-25) , contains such
argumentative language.

The first sentence of the instruction

reads:
[Y]ou are instructed that every person,
acting with the mental state required for
the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.
(R. 245). This is merely a verbatim reading of Utah Code Ann.
§76-2-202 (1978) and is not contested.
However, the second and final sentence reads:
. . . [a]ssisting a person who is known to
have just committed a crime to flee from
the scene of that crime would render one
criminally liable for that crime to the
same degree as the actual perpetrator.
(R. 245). This more properly belongs in a closing argument,
since it is an application of the law to the facts of the case
based on a particular theory of the case.

It is not merely a

statement of the law but unduly comments on the evidence and
gives it greater emphasis than is proper.
Since Mr. Webb was prejudiced by this instruction, which
pointed the jury toward the prosecution's theory of Mr. Webb's
culpability, his conviction should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Appellant respectfully
requests this Court to reverse Mr. Webb's conviction and
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remand this case for dismissal or a new trial; or, in the
alternative, remand for resentencing.
Respectfully submitted this

day of May, 1989

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant
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APPENDIX

United States Constitutional Provision
Utah Constitutional Provisions
Utah Statutes and Rules (in Numerical Order)

50

AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT II
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
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AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed which district shall ha\e
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and causp of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses m his favor, and
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence
AMENDMENT VII
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined m any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
AMENDMENT X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.
The first ten Amendments were proposed by the first Congress and were ratified
ts follows New Jersey, Nov 20, 1789 Maryland, Dec 19, 1789, North Carolina,
Dec 22, 1789, South Carolina, Jan 19, 1790, New Hampshire, J a n 25, 1790 Deliwaie
Jan 28, 1790, Pennsylvania, Mar 10, 1790 New York, March 27, 1790, Ehode Island,
June 15, 1790, Vermont, Nov 3, 1791, Virginia, Dec 15, 1791 Connecticut, Georgia
ifld Massachusetts ratified them on April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939 and March 2, 1939,
respectively.

AMENDMENT XI
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sublets of any Foreign State
History Proposed by Congress on Sepw b e r 5, 1794, declared to have been rati-

fied by the legislatures of three fourths
of all the states on January 8, 179S

AMENDMENT XII
for

The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote b\ ballot
President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an
19
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Act concerning question of their ultimate
liability. Industrial Comm. v. Evans, 52
U. 394^ 174 P. 825.
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid because it delegates to industrial
commission the power to hear, consider
and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their
property rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 57 U. 246, 194 P. 322.
Dependents of employee killed by acts
of third party, a stranger to employment,
are not limited to recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclushely, unless they have assigned their rights to
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac.
R. Co., 70 U. 441, 261 P. 9.

Land Registration Act.
The Torrens Act was not unconstitutional as conferring judicial powers on
registrar of titles. Ashton-Jenkins Co. v.
Bramel, 56 U. oS7, 192 P. 375, 11 A. L. R.
752.
Limitation of actions.
This section does not preclude the legislature from prescribing a statute of limitations for time within which to assail
the regularity or organization of an irrigation district. Horn \ . ShaflVi, 47 U. .">.">,
151 P. 555.
Occupational disease law.
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in
excluding compensation for partial disability from silicosis, and in rendering
remedy under that act exclusive so as to
abrogate common-law right of action
therefor, is not unconstitutional as depiiving such employee of his remedy by due
course of law for injury done to his person. Masich v. United States Smelting,
Ref. & Min. Co., 113 U. 101, 191 P. 2d 612.

Collateral References.
Constitutional LawC=>322, 324, 327, 328.
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 709, 711,
714, 719.
16 Am. Jur. 2d 718-721, Constitutional
Law §§ 382-385.
Law Reviews.
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens,
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., 35 Calif. L. Rev.
380.
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
in Anglo-American Law, Paxton Blair, 29
Colum. L. Rev. 1.
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah
L. Rev. 248.

Waiver of rights.
Right to apply to courts for redress of
wrong is substantial right, and will not
be waived by contract except through
unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle,
08 U. 486, 251 P. 16.
Workmen's compensation law.
Employers are entitled to have recourse
to courts under Workmen's Compensation

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Comparable Provision.
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 16.
Cross-References.
Defendant as witness, 77-44-5.
Double jeopardy, statutory provision,
77-1-10.

—acquittal notwithstanding defect in information or indictment, 77-24-12.
—acquittal or dismissal without judgment, 77-24-11.
— a c * s punishable in different ways,
punishment limited to one, 76-1-23.
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ART. I, § 14

Sec 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.]
The right of t i e people to bo secuie m their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable sc arches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly desciibing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized
Whether a search and seizure is reason
able is to be determined bv the trial court,
and evidence m plain view of the officei
pursuing a felon mav be rightfullv seized
and such seizure is not a violation of the
federal constitutional protection as set
forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U S b43, 6
L Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct 1684 State v.
Allred, 16 U. (2d) 41, 395 P. 2d 535

Comparable Provision.
Montana Const , Art I I I , § 7
Cioss References.
Controlled Substances Act, search warn u t s , 58 37-10.
Liquor, search, seizure and confiscation,
62 5 16 et seq.
Statutory provisions generally, 77 54 1
et seq.
In general.
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum
nor under a motion to examine will an
examination be permitted of a nature to
contiavene provision against unreasonable
searches and seizures Evans v. Evans, 98
I 189, 98 P. 2d 703
It is generally recognized that the legiti
mate use of a search warrant is restricted
to public prosecutions, and in no event
ma} such proceeding be invoked for the
piotection ot a m u e private right. Allen
v Trueman, Judge, 100 U. 36, 110 P 2d
355
It is use to which it is put that renders
property, otherwise lawful and rightful
to hive, use and possess, subject to seizure
and forfeiture Hemenwav 6c Moser Co.
v Funk, 100 U. 72, 106 P 2d 779.
For general discussion of Fourth Amend
ment to federal Constitution, see Citv of
Pnce v Javnes, 113 U 89, 191 P 2d 606.
Where police officers have obtained evidence by illegal methods, such as an un
liwtul search in violation of this section,
it should not be used to convict a person
of crime State v. Louden, 15 U. (2d) 64,
387 P 2d 240
R a lvmg on tip, officers obtained per
mission from proprietor of motel to enter
deftndant's room where they found a pistoi in a drawer which they identified as
hav mg been stolen in a burglary of a
shopping center. After replacing the pistol
in the drawer they waited outside for the
return of the occupants of the motel room.
The officers, on obtaining defendant's per
mission to search the room, m addition to
the pistol, found wrist watches and crow
bars which also came from the shopping
center On the trial of defendant for second degree burglary, trial court propeil}
admitted evidence obtained during such
s
ea (h as the search was not unreasonable
^tate v Louden, lr> U (2d) 64, 387 P 2d
-40

Automobile search.
Evidence taken from automobile de
fendant was driving and subsequentlv
used to convict him of burglarv and
grand larceny did not violate constitu
tional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures, even though taking
was not connected with cause of arrest
and was done without search wairant in
view of facts that car was lawfullv taken
into possession and impounded when de
fendant was arrested for driving automobile which did not belong to him and
without valid driver's license and since,
under such circumstances, it was responsi
bihty of police impounding car to take
inventory of its contents State v Criscola,
21 U. (2d) 272, 444 P. 2d 517.
City ordinance.
City ordinance allegedly enacted pursuant to powers granted bv 10 8 50, prowd
mg that right of people of citv "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable seirches and
seizures shall not be violated," and making
violation thereof misdemeanor, was void
for vagueness and uncertainty in failing
to define or presence standards to deter
mine what acts constitute unieisonable
searches or seizures Citv of P n c e v
Jaynes, 113 U. 89, 191 P . 2d 000
Drags.
Marijuana taken during the search of
detendant's home pursuant to warrant was
unlawfully taken and evidence should
have been suppressed on defendant's mo
tion because search warrant w is based
on police officer's oral deposition r i t h e r
than on oath or affirmation State v Jasso,
21 U (2d) 24, 439 P 2d 844
Liquor.
Where police officers w*r< in\ estigating
rooming house under citv oidiname to
determine if liquor wa^ being sold there,
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76-3-203

violation. Any time spent by a person outside of confinement after commission
of a parole violation shall not constitute service of the total sentence unless
the person shall be exonerated at a hearing to revoke the parole. Any time
spent in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of
parole shall constitute service of the sentence and, in the case of exoneration
at such hearing or upon a decision rendered, the time spent shall be included
in computing the total parole term.
(4) Whenever any parolee, without authority from the board of pardons,
shall absent himself from the state or avoid or evade parole supervision, the
period of absence, avoidance, or evasion shall toll the parole period.
(5) Nothing in this section shall preclude the board of pardons from paroling or discharging an inmate at any time within the discretion of the board of
pardons unless otherwise specifically provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-202; L. 1983, ch. 88, § 4.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment
inserted Mor in the case
on parole without
violation" m the first sentence of subsec (1),
inserted "or m the case
on parole without
violation" in subsec (2)(a), inserted "or tenyear, as the case mav be" in the first sentence
J
'
j JJ j« 1
xu
r
/0,
of subsec. (3), and added unless otherwise specifically provided by law" to subsec. (5).
Authority of trial court.
Defendants request that the trial court or-

der that credit be given for the period of time
he spent in pretrial detention was outside the
limits prescribed and therefore beyond the
court's power, since the power to reduce or term i n a t e sentences is exclusive with the Board of
Schreuder, 712 P 2d 264
Pardons
State v
(Utah 1985)
r»^ j r
J
±4.1.1.1
^ . U J
Board of pardons, not the trial court, had auX h o Ln t ^ X a^ n t J ^ J .
J A r li. A
*
y *? ^
defendant credit for the tune
he served prior to conviction State v Alvillar,
748

p 2d

207

(Utah

Ct

App

198g)

76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm
used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
25
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the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a
felony m which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of
the felony and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not
less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-203, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-203; L. 1976, ch. 9, § 1;
1977, ch. 88, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment
inserted "unless otherwise specifically provided by l a w ' in subsec (1)

ANALYSIS

Increased penalty for use of firearm
Notice
Cited
Increased penalty for use of firearm.
Information need not state that the enhanc ed penalty for use of a firearm will be applied upon conviction, it is sufficient if it alleges either the defendant is being charged under this section or that a firearm was used in
the commission of the offense State v Angus,
581 P 2 d 992 (Utah 1978)
It is not required that a specific and separate
finding of use of a firearm must be made in
order to impose the enhanced penalty for use of
a firearm in the commission of a felony State
v Angus, 581 P 2d 992 (Utah 1978)
The increased penalty for use of a firearm in
the commission of a felony does not impose
double punishment for the same criminal act
nor does it create a separate offense that must
be pled as a separate charge State v Angus,
581 P 2d 992 (Utah 1978)
Title total maximum enhancement sentence
that a court may impose for use of firearms in

first and second degree felonies is five years,
therefore, trial court did not have authority to
impose two consecutive enhancement sentences, one for one year and another for five
years, for a total of six years, upon defendant's
guilty plea to second degree murder involving
use of a firearm State v Willett, 694 P 2d 601
(Utah 1984)
Notice.
The enhancement statute is merely part of
the penalty, and adequate notice is given if the
information alleges either that the enhancement statute may apply or that a firearm was
used m the commission of the offense State v
Speer, 74 Utah Adv Rep 16 (1988)
Cited in State v Schreuder, 712 P 2d 264
(Utah 1985), State v Rodriguez, 718 P 2d 395
(Utah 1986)
Law Reviews. — Potter v Murray City
Another Interpretation of Polygamy and the
First Amendment, 1986 Utah L Rev 345

76-3-205, Infraction conviction — Fine, forfeiture, and disqualification.
Cited m State v Neeley, 73 Utah Adv Rep
53 (1988)
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Evidence.
In prosecution for robbery, based on defendant's alleged act of taking money
from person and presence of another,
where defense was that, if defendant
actually was guilty of such act, he took
money under claim of ownership and in
honest belief that he had right to it,
defendant had the right to testify as to
his intent, belief, and motive at time of
alleged robbery; it was error for trial
court to refuse to permit him to answer
question, asked while he was testifying
in his own behalf, as to whether at time
when he allegedly took the money, he
honestly believed money was his and that
he had a right to take it. People v.
Hughes, 11 U. 100, 39 P. 492.
Possession of stolen property alone
was not sufficient to sustain conviction
for robbery, but its quality as evidence
was of such high degree that only slight
corroborative proof of other inculpatory
circumstances would warrant conviction
of felony murder based on intent to rob.
State v. Boyland, 27 U. (2d) 268, 495 P.
2d 315.
Indictment or information.
Indictment which charged felonious
taking by defendant by means of force,
violence and fear from the immediate
presence of a party against his will was

sufficient, though statutory language was
"person" rather than "presence." People
v. Kerm, 8 U. 268, 30 P. 988.
Indictment for robbery, which failed
to charge that property taken from person of prosecutor was taken "by means
of force or fear" was insufficient, since
those words constituted necessary element found in definition of robbery. State
v. Davis, 28 U. 10, 76 P. 705.
Information for robbery which used
word "robbed" sufficiently informed accused of nature and cause of accusation, at
least in absence of demand for bill of particulars; there was but one crime of robbery and words such as "by means of
force or fear" were unnecessary, as indicated in short form prescribed by 77-21-47.
State v. Bobbins, 102 U. 119, 127 P. 2d
1042.
Instructions.
Fact that instruction defined robbery
in language of statute did not render
such proper definition improper because
instruction did not also define included
offenses of grand and petit larceny, where
court at defendant's request gave instruction that precluded consideration of
included offenses and no request was made
for instructions defining them. State v.
Sullivan, 73 U. 582, 276 P. 166.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person commits aggravated
robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be deemed to be u in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of a robbery.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by
L. 1973, eh. 196, §76-6-302; L. 1975, ch.
51, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment substituted
present language of subd. ( l ) ( a )
"Uses a deadly weapon; or."

the
for

"Facsimile of a firearm."
Instruction defining "facsimile of a firearm'' as "any instrument that by its appearance resembles a firearm'' was proper.
State v. Turner, 572 P. 2d 387.

Unloaded firearm.
Aggravated robbery may be committed
with an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner,
572 P. 2J 387.
CoUateral References.
Robberv<3=3ll.
77 C.J.S. Robbery § 28.
67 Am. Jur. 2d 31, Robbery §4.
Law Reviews.
Utah Legislative
Utah L. Rev. 834.
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76-10-309. Infernal machine—Venue of prosecution for shipping —Any
person knowingly delivering any infernal machine to any railwa\, express,
or stage company, or to any person or company whatever, for transmission
to any person m another county may be prosecuted in the count} m which
he delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted
History: C. 1953, 76-10-309, enacted by
L. 1973, ch 196, § 76-10-309.

Collateral References.
E^plosivesC^o
35 C J S Explosives § 12
31 Am Jur. 2d 892, Explosions and Ex
plosives § 123.

Part 4
Fences
76-10-401. Fencing of shafts and wells —Any person who has sunk or
shall sink a shaft or well on the public domain for any purpose shall inclose
it with a substantial curb or fence, which shall be at least four and onehalf feet high. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor.
History C. 1953, 76-10-401, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-401.

Collateral References.
NeghgenceC=>144.
J
n
£A'&Xg
2J™. § 242.
57%\2
Am Jur
2d 625, Negligence

Cross-References.
Miscellaneous offenses respecting mines,
40 5 1 et seq

Part5
Weapons
76-10-501. Definitions.—For the purpose of this part
(1) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that m the manner of its
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury In
construing whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument,
object, or thing; the character of the wound produced, if any, and the
manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used shall be determinative.
(2) "Firearms" means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off shotguns, or sawed
off rifles, and/or any device that could be used as a weapon from which is
expelled a projectile by any force
(3) "Sawed-off shotgun" means a shotgun having a barrel or barrels
of Less than eighteen inches in length, or m the case of a rifle, ha\ ing a
barrel or barrels of less than sixteen inches m length, or any weapon made
from a rifle or shotgun (whether b} alteration, modification or otherwise)
if the weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches
(4) "Prohibited area" means any place where i t is unlawful to discharge a weapon.
236
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(5) "Crime of violence" means murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape,
nia? hem kidnaping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon,
assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment for
nore than one year, arson punishable b\ imprisonment for more tl an one
\ear, or an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences
(6) "Bureau means the Utah state bureau of criminal identification
History C. 1953, 76-10-501, enacted W
L 1973, eh, 196, §76-10 501, L. 1974, ch
32, §27

tvpe handgun is a dangerous weapon"
under law, but that "gun clip alone vuth
or without cartridges is not a dangerous
weapon" were not error because consonant
W1 th statute and not prejudicial to detend
ant, State v Nielsen, 544 P 2d 489

Compiler's Notes.
The 1974 amendment substituted "pro
-jectile" for "projective" in subsec (2)
Substitution of "gun" for "dangerous
weapon ' in jury instructions
J u r y instructions which stated that to
convict defendant he must have "had a
gun in his possession" and that "a pistol

Collateral References.
\VeaponsC=»8
94 C J S Weapons § 1
79 Am Jur 2d 3, Weapons and Firearms § 1

76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded—For the purpose of this
section, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or other weapon described
in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when there is an unexpended
cartridge, shell or projectile in the firing position, except m the case
of pistols and revolvers, in which case they shall be deemed loaded when
the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is m a position that the
manual operation of anv mechanism once would cause the unexpended
cartridge, shell, or projectile to be fired, and a muzzle loading firearm
shall be deemed to be loaded when it is capped or primed and has a
powder charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders
H i s t o r y C 1953, 79-100-502, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-10-502, L. 1974, ch.
32, § 28.

Collateral References.
79 Am J u r 2d 7, Weapons and Fire
arms § 3.

Compiler's Notes
The 1974 amendment substituted "pro
jectile" for "projective" in two instances

76-10-503 Possession of dangerous weapon—Persons not permitted to
have—(1) An} person who is not a citizen of the United States, or anv
person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under the laws of
the United States, the state of Utah or any other state government, or
country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drusr or ?ny person
who has been declared mentally incompetent shall not own or have in his
possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as de
fined in this part Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off
shotgun he shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree
(2) Any person who is on parole for a felony or is incarcerated at
the Utah state prison shall not have in his possession or under his custody
or control any dangerous weapon as defined m th s part Any person who
237
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CHAPTER 32
COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS
Section
77-32 1

77-32-2

Minimum standards pro\ided by
county for defense of indigent de
fendants
Assignment of counsel on request of
defendant or order of court

Section
77 32 5

Expenses of printing bnel& depo&i
tions and transcripts

77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county for defense of indigent defendants.
The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, cit\
and town for the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts
and various administrative bodies of the state
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial
probability of the deprivation of his liberty,
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel,
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense,
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client, and
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of
other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by the defending
counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings
History: C. 1953, 77-32-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 67, § 1; 1983, ch.
52, § 1.
Compiler's Notes - The.1983 amendment
substituted s u b s t a n i a l probability for pos
sibihty in subsec (1), and deleted or other
serious criminal sanction" at the end of subsec
Q)
Law Reviews. — Utah Legislative Survey
— 1981, 1982 Utah L Rev 125 202

Nordgren v Mitchell Indigent Paternity Defendants Right to Counsel 1982 Utah L Rev
933
J u d l c i a l j a b b e r w o c k y or Uniform Constitu
Strickland v Washington
{ p ^ ^ ,
&
, _T A
. _
. , . _ „ ^
A
and
National Standards for Ineffective Assis
tance of Counsel Claims, 1985 Utah L Rev
723

77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on request of defendant or
order of court.
Counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent person who is under
arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is a substantial probability
that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or prison if
(1) The defendant requests it, or
(2) The court on its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject of record the opportunity to be
represented
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with the client and with those who might be from proving the services rendered in an action
injured by the client, the lawyer's own involve- to collect it
ment m the transaction and factors that may
extenuate the conduct in question In any case,
Disclosures Otherwise Required or
a disclosure adverse to the client's interest
Authorized
should be no greater than the lawyer believes
The attornev.chent
le
ls d e f i n ^
necessary to the purpose A lawyer s decision ferentlv m v a n ( m s u n s d l c t i o n a ff a u " «
not to take preventive action Permitted by c a , l e d a g a W l t n e g s
teStlmony conW
paragraph (b (1) does not violate this Rule
^ J
^
a d
abgent ^
b
The term another m paragraph (b)(1) m- l 6 ( a )
«*
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Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule.
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the respesentation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not bt
adversely affected; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation. When representation «
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shifl
include explanation to each client of the implications of the common rep*
resentation and the advantages and risks involved.
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COMMENT
Loyalty to a Client
Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client An impermissible
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